Does informing investors tip off competitors? Evidence from the EDGAR log
Review of Financial Economics · 2026-04 · 44 (2)
DOI: 10.1002/rfe.70047 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Financial Economics, online erschienen am 01.04.2026. Verfasst von Cagri Berk Onuk und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 30 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Using data from the EDGAR log, we construct a novel metric capturing the intensity of information acquisition about a firm by its competitors relative to investors, who comprise the intended audience for regulatory disclosure. We show that greater information acquisition by rivals, relative to investors, is more pronounced for younger firms, R&D‐intensive firms, and firms in more competitive industries. Firms subject to greater relative information acquisition by rivals invest less, have lower innovation, and suffer financially, both in terms of profitability and valuation. Taken together, these findings are suggestive of a negative externality of mandatory disclosure requirements.
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APA
Onuk, C. B., Fodor, A., & Diavatopoulos, D. (2026). Does informing investors tip off competitors? Evidence from the EDGAR log. Review of Financial Economics, 44(2). https://doi.org/10.1002/rfe.70047
Vancouver
Onuk CB, Fodor A, Diavatopoulos D. Does informing investors tip off competitors? Evidence from the EDGAR log. Review of Financial Economics. 2026;44(2). doi:10.1002/rfe.70047
BibTeX
@article{Onuk2026,
author = {Onuk, Cagri Berk and Fodor, Andy and Diavatopoulos, Dean},
title = {Does informing investors tip off competitors? Evidence from the EDGAR log},
journal = {Review of Financial Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {44},
number = {2},
doi = {10.1002/rfe.70047}
}
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