Insider stock pledging and stock price informativeness: Evidence from India
Review of Financial Economics · 2023-01 · 41 (1) · 65-85
DOI: 10.1002/rfe.1161 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Financial Economics, online erschienen am 14.03.2022. Verfasst von Amanjot Singh. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 11-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 67 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Insiders’ shares can act as collateral while raising funds from lenders. This study examines the impact of insiders’ stock pledging activities on stock price informativeness using a sample of 1835 Indian firms. Our findings report that insider stock pledging increases the informational efficiency of stock prices. This informational efficiency increases for larger firms with: (1) financial constraints (high leverage and low cash holdings); (2) greater reliance on trade credit; and (3) higher indulgence in related party transactions. We also provide evidence on abnormal share turnover as a trading mechanism through which insider stock pledging is related to stock price informativeness. Our findings are robust across different specifications and after accounting for endogeneity issues.
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APA
Singh, A. (2023). Insider stock pledging and stock price informativeness: Evidence from India. Review of Financial Economics, 41(1), 65-85. https://doi.org/10.1002/rfe.1161
Vancouver
Singh A. Insider stock pledging and stock price informativeness: Evidence from India. Review of Financial Economics. 2023;41(1):65-85. doi:10.1002/rfe.1161
BibTeX
@article{Singh2023,
author = {Singh, Amanjot},
title = {Insider stock pledging and stock price informativeness: Evidence from India},
journal = {Review of Financial Economics},
year = {2023},
volume = {41},
number = {1},
pages = {65--85},
doi = {10.1002/rfe.1161}
}
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