Quantum Attacks on Type‐1 Generalized Feistel Schemes
Advanced Quantum Technologies · 2023-10 · 6 (10)
DOI: 10.1002/qute.202300155 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Advanced Quantum Technologies, online erschienen am 24.07.2023. Verfasst von Hong‐Wei Sun und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 20-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 52 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Generalized Feistel schemes (GFSs) are extremely important and extensively researched cryptographic schemes. In this paper, the security of Type‐1 GFS in quantum circumstances is investigated. On the one hand, in the qCCA setting, a new quantum polynomial‐time distinguisher on ‐round Type‐1 GFS with branches is given, which extends the previous results by rounds. This leads to a more efficient analysis of type‐1 GFS, that is, the complexity of some previous key‐recovery attacks is reduced by a factor of , where k is the key length of the internal round function. On the other hand, for CAST‐256, which is a certain block cipher based on Type‐1 GFS, a 17‐round quantum distinguisher in the qCPA setting is given. Based on this, an ‐round quantum key‐recovery attack with complexity is constructed.
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
Zitieren
APA
Sun, H., Cai, B., Qin, S., Wen, Q., & Gao, F. (2023). Quantum Attacks on Type‐1 Generalized Feistel Schemes. Advanced Quantum Technologies, 6(10). https://doi.org/10.1002/qute.202300155
Vancouver
Sun H, Cai B, Qin S, Wen Q, Gao F. Quantum Attacks on Type‐1 Generalized Feistel Schemes. Advanced Quantum Technologies. 2023;6(10). doi:10.1002/qute.202300155
BibTeX
@article{Sun2023,
author = {Sun, Hong‐Wei and Cai, Bin‐Bin and Qin, Su‐Juan and Wen, Qiao‐Yan and Gao, Fei},
title = {Quantum Attacks on Type‐1 Generalized Feistel Schemes},
journal = {Advanced Quantum Technologies},
year = {2023},
volume = {6},
number = {10},
doi = {10.1002/qute.202300155}
}
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