Green or non‐green product: A game‐theoretic framework to make optimal decision in a two‐level supply chain
Managerial and Decision Economics · 2024-12 · 45 (8) · 5825-5845
DOI: 10.1002/mde.4335 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Managerial and Decision Economics, online erschienen am 14.08.2024. Verfasst von Gayapada Santra und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 63 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper aims to discuss the decisions made by the retailer and manufacturer in a supply chain about pricing, green level, and quality of a product. The centralized model and the manufacturer‐led Stackelberg gaming model are developed for a conventional product and its environmentally friendly version. The two green models are subsequently compared with two non‐green models. Finally, a comprehensive variation of the model is considered, accounting for both green and non‐green products. The green‐only supply chain generates higher profit than the one that uses non‐green products. A revenue‐sharing contract is also employed to coordinate the supply chain.
Zitieren
APA
Santra, G., Maiti, T., & Giri, B. C. (2024). Green or non‐green product: A game‐theoretic framework to make optimal decision in a two‐level supply chain. Managerial and Decision Economics, 45(8), 5825-5845. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4335
Vancouver
Santra G, Maiti T, Giri BC. Green or non‐green product: A game‐theoretic framework to make optimal decision in a two‐level supply chain. Managerial and Decision Economics. 2024;45(8):5825-5845. doi:10.1002/mde.4335
BibTeX
@article{Santra2024,
author = {Santra, Gayapada and Maiti, Tarun and Giri, Bibhas Chandra},
title = {Green or non‐green product: A game‐theoretic framework to make optimal decision in a two‐level supply chain},
journal = {Managerial and Decision Economics},
year = {2024},
volume = {45},
number = {8},
pages = {5825--5845},
doi = {10.1002/mde.4335}
}
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