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Do Concentrated Owners Pay Less? French Evidence on Tax Avoidance and Female Directors

Habiba Laadhari, Juraj Válek, Hajer Jarrar, Virginie Hachard, Matteo Rossi

Strategic Change · 2026-11 · 35 (6) · 1189-1198

DOI: 10.1002/jsc.70121 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Strategic Change, online erschienen am 01.09.2026. Verfasst von Habiba Laadhari und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 58 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This study examines whether concentrated voting control increases corporate tax avoidance in French listed firms and whether board gender diversity and audit committee independence constrain that relationship. Using 3388 firm‐year observations from 242 CAC All Shares firms from 2009 to 2022, the analysis combines hand‐collected voting rights concentration with three tax‐avoidance measures. Effective tax rate measures are transformed so that higher values consistently indicate higher avoidance, and book tax differences are used to capture reporting gaps between accounting and taxable income. The main estimations use generalized least squares with year and industry fixed effects, firm‐clustered robust standard errors, and system generalized method of moments checks for endogeneity. The results support an entrenchment view. Higher ownership concentration is associated with greater tax avoidance across the effective tax rate and book tax difference measures. Board gender diversity weakens this positive association, especially where female representation moves from very low to moderate levels. Audit committee independence also dampens the concentration avoidance link, while the COVID‐19 year strengthens it. The study contributes to governance and tax avoidance research by showing how voting control, board composition, and crisis conditions jointly shape tax risk in a civil law setting.

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APA

Laadhari, H., Válek, J., Jarrar, H., Hachard, V., & Rossi, M. (2026). Do Concentrated Owners Pay Less? French Evidence on Tax Avoidance and Female Directors. Strategic Change, 35(6), 1189-1198. https://doi.org/10.1002/jsc.70121

Vancouver

Laadhari H, Válek J, Jarrar H, Hachard V, Rossi M. Do Concentrated Owners Pay Less? French Evidence on Tax Avoidance and Female Directors. Strategic Change. 2026;35(6):1189-1198. doi:10.1002/jsc.70121

BibTeX
@article{Laadhari2026,
  author = {Laadhari, Habiba and Válek, Juraj and Jarrar, Hajer and Hachard, Virginie and Rossi, Matteo},
  title = {Do Concentrated Owners Pay Less? French Evidence on Tax Avoidance and Female Directors},
  journal = {Strategic Change},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {35},
  number = {6},
  pages = {1189--1198},
  doi = {10.1002/jsc.70121}
}
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