How do CEOs make investment decisions in their early years of tenure? Evidence from investment efficiency
Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance · 2023-07 · 34 (3) · 64-79
DOI: 10.1002/jcaf.22613 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance, online erschienen am 03.01.2023. Verfasst von Huiqi Gan. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 61 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Career concerns are escalated during the early years of a CEO's tenure as the market is uncertain about the new CEO's ability. This study examines whether such increased career concerns induce investment inefficiency during the early years of a CEO's tenure in US firms. I find that underinvestment happens in the early years and that the underinvestment problem is most evident when the new CEO is externally appointed and has the low managerial ability. Additional analyses show that the underinvestment problems are more pronounced when firms have a high level of information asymmetry and low financial reporting quality.
Zitieren
APA
Gan, H. (2023). How do CEOs make investment decisions in their early years of tenure? Evidence from investment efficiency. Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance, 34(3), 64-79. https://doi.org/10.1002/jcaf.22613
Vancouver
Gan H. How do CEOs make investment decisions in their early years of tenure? Evidence from investment efficiency. Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance. 2023;34(3):64-79. doi:10.1002/jcaf.22613
BibTeX
@article{Gan2023,
author = {Gan, Huiqi},
title = {How do CEOs make investment decisions in their early years of tenure? Evidence from investment efficiency},
journal = {Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance},
year = {2023},
volume = {34},
number = {3},
pages = {64--79},
doi = {10.1002/jcaf.22613}
}
EUVIMED