Threat Effects and Work Incentives: Evidence From a Danish Sick Leave Reform
Health Economics · 2026
DOI: 10.1002/hec.70126 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Health Economics, 2026. Verfasst von Jeppe Elholm Madsen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Technology, Management and Economics, Technical University of Denmark, Lyngby, Denmark. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Sick Leave, Return to Work. Die Arbeit nennt 24 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Rockwool Fonden.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper investigates the effects of a 2014 policy reform on paid sick leave in Denmark. The reform shortened the eligibility period from 56 to 26 weeks for paid sick leave and introduced a mandatory return‐to‐work activation program for individuals whose benefits were not extended. The reform initially led to a temporary increase in returns to employment, as individuals on sick leave resumed work to avoid entering the mandatory activation program. However, this effect fades in the long run, and no sustained employment improvements were observed.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Stichwörter der Autor:innen
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- Department of Technology, Management and Economics, Technical University of Denmark, Lyngby, Denmark.
ORCID-Profile: Jeppe Elholm Madsen
Förderung
- Rockwool Fonden
Zitieren
APA
Madsen, J. E. (2026). Threat Effects and Work Incentives: Evidence From a Danish Sick Leave Reform. Health Economics. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.70126
Vancouver
Madsen JE. Threat Effects and Work Incentives: Evidence From a Danish Sick Leave Reform. Health Economics. 2026. doi:10.1002/hec.70126
BibTeX
@article{Madsen2026,
author = {Madsen, Jeppe Elholm},
title = {Threat Effects and Work Incentives: Evidence From a Danish Sick Leave Reform},
journal = {Health Economics},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1002/hec.70126}
}
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