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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Strategic Delay and Bargaining Over Public Insurance Coverage for Drugs in Australia

Jing Jing Li iD, Anthony Harris iD

Health Economics · 2026-06 · 35 (6) · 1005-1018

DOI: 10.1002/hec.70095 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Health Economics, online erschienen am 12.03.2026. Verfasst von Jing Jing Li und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Centre for Health Economics, Monash Business School, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Negotiating, Financing, Government, Insurance, Pharmaceutical Services, Drug Industry. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 34 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Australian Research Council.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Public funding for pharmaceuticals often follows repeated negotiation between manufacturers and a public agency, yet little empirical work examines how the timing of agreement reflects the economic structure of these interactions. Using a duration model of negotiations in Australia from 2005 to 2018, we assess whether observed patterns of delay and agreement align with dynamic bargaining theory under incomplete information. Agreements from 634 submissions for 400 therapies required a median of 16 months, and 71% of negotiation rounds ended without agreement. Therapies with lower expected value to the agency—reflected in higher incremental cost per QALY, greater budget impact, or evidence uncertainty—experienced longer delays and lower agreement rates, while those with strong clinical importance, perceived need, or elevated public interest were listed more quickly. Delays also varied across therapeutic classes and with a therapy's position in the sequencing of available treatments. The observed patterns point to a systematic listing rule in which therapies are funded when expected health gains justify their opportunity costs. They also support the view that the timing of agreement reflects strategic negotiation under uncertainty, not simply procedural delay.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

NegotiatingFinancing, GovernmentInsurance, Pharmaceutical ServicesDrug IndustryInsurance CoverageAustraliaHumansTime FactorsCost-Benefit Analysis

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

drug fundingdynamic bargainingpharmaceuticals

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Centre for Health Economics, Monash Business School, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia.

ORCID-Profile: Jing Jing Li, Anthony Harris

Förderung

  • Australian Research Council

Zitieren

APA

Li, J. J., & Harris, A. (2026). Strategic Delay and Bargaining Over Public Insurance Coverage for Drugs in Australia. Health Economics, 35(6), 1005-1018. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.70095

Vancouver

Li JJ, Harris A. Strategic Delay and Bargaining Over Public Insurance Coverage for Drugs in Australia. Health Economics. 2026;35(6):1005-1018. doi:10.1002/hec.70095

BibTeX
@article{Li2026,
  author = {Li, Jing Jing and Harris, Anthony},
  title = {Strategic Delay and Bargaining Over Public Insurance Coverage for Drugs in Australia},
  journal = {Health Economics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {35},
  number = {6},
  pages = {1005--1018},
  doi = {10.1002/hec.70095}
}
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