Political Influence as Strategic Substitution: Carbon Performance and Corporate Lobbying in US Climate Policy
Business Strategy and the Environment · 16.11.2026
DOI: 10.1002/bse.71874 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Business Strategy and the Environment, online erschienen am 16.11.2026. Verfasst von Mohammed Ibrahim Khan und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 40 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Firms facing environmental regulation can respond through both operational adjustment and political engagement, yet existing research provides limited insight into how these strategies interact. This study addresses the theoretical question of how firms allocate resources between market and nonmarket strategies and whether corporate lobbying functions as a complement to, or a substitute for, environmental abatement. Drawing on public choice theory, we argue that firms allocate resources across alternative strategies based on relative costs and expected benefits, such that firms with poor carbon performance, facing higher compliance costs, are more likely to substitute towards lobbying. We further propose that this relationship is contingent on the credibility of the regulatory environment. We test these arguments using panel data on US firms' carbon emissions and lobbying expenditures from 2010 to 2020, exploiting the US withdrawal from the COP21 Paris Agreement as an empirical setting capturing a broader class of deregulatory shocks. The results show that firms with higher emissions systematically engage in more lobbying and that this relationship weakens following the decline in climate accountability. This study contributes to the literature by conceptualising corporate lobbying as part of a strategic allocation between market and nonmarket responses, by identifying carbon performance as a key driver of firms' strategic behaviour and by demonstrating how changes in regulatory credibility shape the interaction between environmental performance and corporate political activity.
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APA
Khan, M. I., Rohani, A., Shahrour, M. H., & Lodh, S. (2026). Political Influence as Strategic Substitution: Carbon Performance and Corporate Lobbying in US Climate Policy. Business Strategy and the Environment. https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.71874
Vancouver
Khan MI, Rohani A, Shahrour MH, Lodh S. Political Influence as Strategic Substitution: Carbon Performance and Corporate Lobbying in US Climate Policy. Business Strategy and the Environment. 2026. doi:10.1002/bse.71874
BibTeX
@article{Khan2026,
author = {Khan, Mohammed Ibrahim and Rohani, Alireza and Shahrour, Mohamad H. and Lodh, Suman},
title = {Political Influence as Strategic Substitution: Carbon Performance and Corporate Lobbying in US Climate Policy},
journal = {Business Strategy and the Environment},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1002/bse.71874}
}
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